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Abstract 
Two computable general equilibrium models, one global and the other providing U.S. regional detail, 
are applied to analysis of the future of U.S. natural gas as an input to an MIT interdisciplinary study 
The Future of Natural Gas. The focus is on uncertainties including the scale and cost of gas 
resources, the costs of competing technologies, the pattern of greenhouse gas mitigation, and the 
evolution of global natural gas markets. Results show that the outlook for gas over the next several 
decades is very favorable. In electric generation, given the unproven and relatively high cost of other 
low-carbon generation alternatives, gas is likely the preferred alternative to coal. A broad GHG 
pricing policy would increase gas use in generation but reduce use in other sectors, on balance 
increasing its role from present levels. The shale gas resource is a major contributor to this optimistic 
view of the future of gas. Gas can be an effective bridge to a lower emissions future, but investment in 
the development of still lower CO2 technologies remains an important priority. Also, international gas 
resources may well prove to be less costly than those in the U.S., except for the lowest-cost domestic 
shale resources, and the emergence of an integrated global gas market could result in significant U.S. 
gas imports. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. energy policy is shaped by concerns about energy security, the adequacy of supplies at 
reasonable and stable prices, and environmental impacts of energy production and use. Natural 
gas is a relatively clean fuel with lower emissions of greenhouse gases and conventional 
pollutants than coal and petroleum products. Moreover, newly advanced technologies for 
exploitation of domestic resources may make increased reliance on gas economic. In this 
changing resource picture four major areas of uncertainty will combine to determine gas 
production and use in the U.S.: 
• The structure of greenhouse gas policies that may be put into effect in coming years: what 
form will emissions reductions policies take and how stringent will be the control levels? 
• The scale of domestic gas resources: with production from conventional resources falling, 
will sources such as tight gas, coal bed methane and shale gas allow U.S. production to 
continue to grow at stable prices? 
• The technology mix in a carbon-constrained world, particularly in the electric sector: how 
will costs of competitors for natural gas respond to R&D and other efforts to stimulate cost 
reduction? 
• The state of world gas production and trade: will we transition to a fully integrated world 
market like that for crude oil or will costs and other limits on intercontinental gas transport 
lead to the persistence of national and regional markets where forces to resolve interregional 
price differences are dampened?  
These influences will interact to affect gas prices, use, domestic production, trade, and the 
need for further development of the natural gas distribution infrastructure in the U.S.  They also 
will act in combination with broader forces affecting energy use including potential new uses for 
gas, such as compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles in transportation, domestic economic 
growth, and changes in world markets that affect the costs of fuels with which gas competes. 
We explore these interactions as input to an MIT study, The Future of Natural Gas (MIT,  
2010) applying first a global economic model that resolves key countries including the U.S. and 
includes details of natural gas resources, energy demand, and competing energy supply 
technology. Then, as a step toward understanding the implications for the adequacy of existing 
domestic gas infrastructure, we augment results from the global economic model simulations 
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using a U.S. regional model that helps to identify how regional demand and supply may change 
in the future. 
2. STUDY METHODS AND DATA 
2.1 Global and U.S. Regional Models  
Projections are made using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model 
and the U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model. Both are multi-region, multi-sector 
representations of the economy. The core results for the study are simulated using the EPPA 
model (Paltsev et al., 2005; Paltsev et al., 2010). It is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model that solves for the prices and quantities of interacting domestic and international markets 
for energy and non-energy goods as well as for equilibrium in factor markets. The USREP model 
is nearly identical in structure to EPPA, but represents the U.S. only, segmenting it into 12 single 
and multi-state regions (Rausch et al., 2009, 2010). The foreign sector is represented as export 
supply and import demand functions rather than a full representation of foreign economies, and 
interstate capital is mobile reflecting the ease of strongly connected capital markets within the 
U.S. whereas in the EPPA model international capital flows are restricted. 
The way these models represent an economy is shown in Table 1. They include sectors that 
produce and convert energy, industrial sectors that use energy and produce other goods and 
services, and households that consume goods and services (including energy) with the non-
energy production side of the economy aggregated into the five industrial sectors shown. These 
and other sectors have intermediate demands for all goods and services determined through an 
input-output structure.  Final demand sectors include households, government, investment goods, 
and exports.  Imports compete with domestic production to supply intermediate and final 
demands.  Demand for fuels and electricity by households includes energy services such as space 
conditioning, lighting, etc., and a separate representation of demand for Household 
Transportation (the private automobile). Energy production and conversion sectors include coal, 
oil, and gas production, petroleum refining, and an extensive set of alternative generation 
technologies. 
Of particular interest in analysis of natural gas are the Electric Generation and Energy-
Intensive Products sectors and the potential penetration of natural gas into Household 
Transportation. Energy supply and conversion are modeled in enough detail to identify fuels and 
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technologies with different CO2 emissions and to represent both fossil and non-fossil 
technologies. The models include the non-CO2 Kyoto gases (CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6).  
Table 1. EPPA and USREP Model Details. 
Country or Region, EPPA model†  Sectors Factors and 
Natural Resources 
United States (USA) Non-Energy Sectors Capital  
Canada (CAN) Agriculture  Labor  
Japan (JPN) Services  Crude Oil 
European Union+ (EUR) Energy-Intensive Products  Natural Gas 
Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Other Industries Products  Coal 
Russia (RUS) Transportation  Shale Oil 
Rest of Europe and Central Asia (ROE) Household Transportation  Nuclear 
India (IND) Other Household Demand Hydro 
China (CHN) Energy Supply & Conversion Wind/Solar 
Brazil (BRA)     Electric Generation Land 
Mexico (MEX)     Conventional Fossil   
Rest of Latin America (LAM)      Hydro   
Higher Income East Asia (ASI)      Existing Nuclear   
Rest of Asia (REA)        Wind & Solar   
Middle East (MES)      Biomass   
Africa (AFR)      Advanced Gas   
         Advanced Gas with CCS   
            Advanced Coal with CCS   
U.S. Regions, USREP model††      Advanced Nuclear  
North East Fuels  
South East      Coal  
North Central      Crude Oil, Shale Oil, Refined Oil  
South Central      Natural Gas, Gas from Coal  
Mountain     Liquids from Biomass  
West      Synthetic Gas  
† Details of regional groupings is provided in Paltsev et al. (2010). 
   †† Details of regional groupings is provided in Rausch et al. (2009). 
All fossil energy resources are modeled in EPPA as graded resources whose cost of 
production rises continuously as they are depleted. In the fossil fuel production sectors, 
elasticities of substitution are set to generate elasticities of supply that fit the resource grades. 
Production in any one period is limited by substitution and the value share of the resource that 
enters the energy sector production functions as a fixed factor. The regional resource value 
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shares reflect estimated rents. Energy resources are subject to depletion based on physical 
production of fuel in the previous period (Paltsev et al., 2005). We modify the approach for this 
study for natural gas supply by creating a two-stage production process. In stage 1 reserves are 
produced from resources, in stage 2 gas is produced from reserves. We apply this structure to 
four categories of gas resources: conventional, tight, shale, and coal-bed methane. Natural gas 
reserves expansion is driven by changes in gas prices, with reserve additions determined by 
elasticities benchmarked to the gas supply curves described in Section 2.2.  
Sixteen geographical regions are represented in the EPPA model, as shown in Table 1, 
including eight of the largest individual countries (USA, Canada, Japan, China, India, Russia, 
Brazil, and Mexico) and eight aggregate regions. The model computes the trade in all energy and 
non-energy goods among these regions so that results can be used to explore potential 
international trade in natural gas. The USREP model is based on a state-level data base, 
aggregated for this study into the six regions shown in the table. 
 The advantage of models of this type is their ability to explore ways that domestic and global 
energy markets will be influenced by the complex interaction of factors like those identified 
above. Most important for this exploration of the future of natural gas, the models provide a 
facility for integrating the combined effect of resource estimates, technology and policy issues. 
Models of any type have limitations, particularly when applied over a multi-decade horizon. 
Other input assumptions besides those mentioned above (e.g., about population and overall 
economic growth, and the ease of an economy’s adjustment to price changes) also are subject to 
uncertainty over decades. There are details of market structure (e.g., various forms of gas 
contracts, political constraints on trade and technology choice) and of the behavior of individual 
industries that are beneath the level of aggregation of sectors within the models and reflected 
only implicitly in the parameters of aggregate production functions for the relatively coarsely 
resolved sectors. Also, because the models are solved on a five-year time step they cannot 
represent the effects of short-term price volatility. Therefore, these model results should be 
viewed not as predictions where confidence can be attributed to the absolute numbers but rather 
as illustrations of the directions and relative magnitudes of various influences on the role of gas, 
and as a basis for forming intuition about likely future developments in a greenhouse-gas-
constrained market environment. 
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2.2 The Representation of Gas Resources 
Among the important inputs to the EPPA model’s sub-model of energy resource development 
and depletion that were re-evaluated for this study are estimates of the amount of resources and 
the costs of extracting them.1 Figure 1 presents global supplies of natural gas by EPPA region 
and uncertainty range. The mean global estimate of 16,200 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) is 150 times 
the global annual natural gas consumption of 108 Tcf in 2009. The range between P90 (90% 
probability of being exceeded) and P10 (10% probability of being exceeded) is from 12,400 to 
20,800 Tcf. The set of natural gas supply functions are based on estimates of recoverable 
volumes of gas categorized as proved reserves, reserve growth and undiscovered resources. The 
proved reserve volumes were taken from figures reported by the US EIA (2009b) and the Oil and 
Gas Journal. The reserve growth estimates were calculated by applying a well cohort analysis 
methodology (NPC, 2003) using historical U.S. field and well data. The undiscovered resource 
estimates were based upon the gas resource assessment work of the USGS (Ahlbrandt et al., 
2005), ICF International, and other agencies  (e.g., Potential Gas Committee, 2009) that execute 
geological assessments, along with MIT statistical analysis. For the U.S. and Canada, both 
conventional and unconventional (tight gas, coal-bed methane, and shale) resource volumes were 
included in the supply functions. Unconventional gas resources were not included in the supply 
functions outside the U.S. and Canada because comprehensive assessments of technically 
recoverable volumes, and the corresponding costs required for their development were not 
available. 
Cost estimates for the different components of the gas supply functions represent the 
breakeven gas price required to bring that volume of gas to market using the ICF Hydrocarbon 
Supply Model (Vidas et al., 1993) and ICF World Gas Supply Model, which implement a 
bottom-up methodology starting at the field or play level. Breakeven gas price calculations 
account for co-product production on an energy equivalent basis. The components of the 
breakeven calculation differ depending on which category of gas resource is being analyzed. In 
the case of proved producing reserves, the breakeven price is simply the operating and 
maintenance (O&M) cost associated with maintaining production from existing wells. For 
proved, but not yet producing, reserves and for reserve growth, a discounted cash flow method 
                                                 
1 Additional information about this analysis is provided in Section 2 of the MIT study, The Future of Natural Gas 
(MIT, 2010). 
6 
 
was used to determine the required breakeven gas price to compensate for the capital spent to 
develop the resource, and to maintain it during its producing life. The calculation of breakeven 
prices for undiscovered conventional resources was executed in a manner that includes the cost 
of gas exploration activity in addition to the development and operating costs at the field level 
and took into account the size of the field, whether the field was onshore or offshore and what 
drilling depths were required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Global Remaining Recoverable Gas Resource (RRR), excluding unconventional 
gas outside North America (MIT, 2010). 
For unconventional resources in the U.S. and Canada a per-well methodology was used, 
where the well density, the per-well production profile and recovery rate were defined based on 
geological analysis of the play. To establish the breakeven gas price and the associated volume 
of gas for each well, the per-well production characteristics were combined with data on drilling 
and operating costs using a discounted cash flow methodology. 
A rate of return of 10% was used, with U.S. and Canadian calculations based on their fiscal 
regimes. For other regions, the breakeven calculations assumed a 50% tax rate and a 20% royalty 
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rate. Development, exploration and operating costs were taken from a number of sources, most 
notably the JAS Survey of Drilling Costs (API, 2006) and the EIA exploration cost database (US 
EIA, 2009a).  
These estimates were made on the basis of costs in 2004, which was near the end of a long 
period of relatively stable development costs, and alternatively using costs in 2007, which were 
near their recent peak. These costs are now in a period of decline, which presents a question as to 
which basis is more appropriate for this analysis. The appropriate basis for our modeling 
purposes is the 2004 cost basis, for two reasons:  (1) in an economic setting, relative prices 
matter and all other prices and costs in the EPPA and USREP models are on a 2004 basis, and 
(2) the 2007 conditions likely a reflect a short-term response to very tight markets and are thus 
not representative of likely longer-term conditions, when suppliers of drilling equipment and the 
like are able to increase supply of this equipment in response to higher prices. We expect that if 
the calculation were shifted to the 2007 cost basis the resulting relative cost of gas and other 
energy sources would be little changed because the cost increases that affected gas exploration 
and drilling affected all major energy development projects.   
The resulting representation of U.S. gas resource supply to which the EPPA model was 
benchmarked are illustrated by the curves in Figure 2 which show the quantity of gas that could 
be commercial at different extraction cost levels. Figure 2a shows the relative magnitudes of the 
mean estimate of U.S. resources, for current technology at 2004 costs, for the four types of 
deposits. Uncertainty in these estimates of resources and cost, for the total of the four categories, 
is shown in Figure 2b, where the Mean case is the horizontal sum of the resource types in Figure 
2a. High and Low cases have been estimated to represent approximately an 80% confidence 
interval (i.e., a 10% chance of being above the High case estimate and a 10% chance of being 
less than the Low).2 Similar uncertainty ranges hold for the gas resources of all other world 
regions, though for regions other than the U.S. all gas types are aggregated into a single resource 
curve. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The analysis below assumes development of Alaska gas resources. If Alaska remains largely stranded over the 
simulation period then total U.S. supply curves would be reduced by approximately 17%, mainly in a reduction 
of conventional resources. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Natural Gas Supply Functions: (a) Mean Supply by Gas Type (Tcf), (b) 
Mean and 80% Confidence Interval for Total U.S. Supply (Tcf). 
These are long run resource supply curves. It is important to note that in the economic model 
production in any period is subject to dynamic processes that add reserves from resources and 
deplete reserves and resources. These features slow development, allocating the available 
resource over time while creating resource rents. As a result the gas price in any period is higher 
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than the extraction cost of the least cost resource available at that time.3 Uncertainty in the 
similar supply functions for oil and coal is not considered in this study. 
2.3 Other Influential Assumptions 
2.3.1 Growth Assumption and Technology Costs  
Several assumptions are important. U.S. economic growth is assumed to be 0.9% per year in 
2005-2010, 3.1% in 2010-2020 (to account for recovery) and 2.4% for 2020-2050. Influential 
cost assumptions are shown in Table 2. The first column contains technology costs imposed in 
the main body of the analysis, as documented in Appendix A with methodology described in 
Morris et al. (2010), and the right-most column shows values to be employed in sensitivity tests 
to be explored later. Nuclear power, coal and gas generation with CO2 capture and storage 
(CCS), and natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants are modeled as perfect substitutes for 
other conventional generation. Some estimates for coal or gas with CCS suggest even higher 
costs for early installations, but here we assume these costs apply to the nth plant, after 
experience is gained with the technology.  
The costs for wind and solar imply that wind is near competitive in the base year and that 
solar costs three times that of conventional coal-fired electricity at that time. These intermittent 
renewables (wind and solar) are distinguished by scale. At low penetration levels they enter as 
imperfect substitutes for conventional electricity generation, and the estimates of the levelized 
cost of electricity (LCOE4) apply to early installations when renewables are at sites with access 
to the best quality resources and to the grid and storage or back-up is not required. Through the 
elasticity of substitution the model imposes a gradually increasing cost of production as their 
share increases, to be limited by the cost with backup.  
These energy sector technologies, like others in the model, are subject to cost reductions over 
time through improvements in labor, energy, and (where applicable) land productivity. 
                                                 
3 Economic rents occur when prices are above the cost of production, and in resource markets the emergence of rent 
is conventionally attributed to three sources: Hotelling, Ricardian, and monopoly.  Hotelling rents occur because 
holders of the resource expect prices to rise in the future and hold back on production today.  Ricardian rents 
occur because resources are graded and there are limits to how fast the least costly resources can be developed 
and produced.  Monopoly rents may also be present because of non-competitive behavior.  The EPPA and 
USREP model structures embed estimates of the current rents in different resources based on existing data 
without explicitly identifying the underlying reason for them.  The reserve-proving, and energy production 
processes in the model restrict the rate of development and thus create persistent rents. 
4 LCOE is the cost of electricity per kWh that over the life of the plant fully recovers operating, fuel, capital costs, 
and financial costs. 
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Table 2. Levelized Cost of Electricity (2005 cents/kWh). 
  Reference Sensitivity 
Coal 5.4  
Advanced Natural Gas (NGCC) 5.6  
Advanced Nuclear† 8.8 7.3 
Coal/Gas with CCS†† 9.2/8.5 6.9/6.6 
Renewables   
   Wind 6.0  
   Biomass 8.5  
   Solar     19.3  
   Substitution elasticity  
   (Wind, Biomass, Solar) 
1.0 3.0 
   Wind+Gas Backup 10.0  
†  Reference costs are based on the data for capital and O&M cost from U.S. Energy Information (US 
EIA, 2010). The lower sensitivity estimate is based on the 2010 update of the 2003 MIT study of 
the Future of Nuclear Power. 
 †† Reference costs are based on the Annual Energy Outlook (US EIA 2010; see endnote 3). The lower 
sensitivity estimate for coal with CCS draws on MIT study of the Future of Coal (2007), for gas 
with CCS on McFarland et al. (2009). 
2.3.2 Representation of International Gas Markets  
Assumptions about the structure of international gas markets also influence the prospects for 
U.S. natural gas, and we explore two ways they may evolve over coming decades. Current trade 
is concentrated within three regional markets, those circled in Figure 3 which highlights North 
American trade (U.S., Canada and Mexico); trade among Europe, Russia and North Africa; and 
Asia/Middle East trade links among Japan, China, Indonesia, Australia, and other Asian 
countries. We represent current regional markets by modeling gas as an imperfect substitute 
among the regions (Armington trade structure). With the Armington trade, supply and demand 
changes in one region are not fully transmitted to other regions, and prices among regions can 
diverge. This formulation tends to preserve existing trade relationships and to limit expansion of 
trade to regions with which there is currently little or no trade. In the discussion to follow this 
case is referred to as a Regional Markets case and most of the analysis below assumes this trade 
pattern is sustained over the study period. 
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Figure 3. Regional Gas Markets. 
However, if demand and supply changes in regions lead to wide price divergence it becomes 
more likely that trade patterns will change over time to take advantage of price differentials, and 
what could develop is a more globally-integrated market akin to the one that emerged in recent 
decades for oil. The gas market has been slower to develop than that for oil—due to the scale 
economies and lumpiness of investment in LNG and long-distance pipeline transport—but 
economic incentives for this evolution are present. To represent globally integrated natural gas 
market, where gas prices equalize among regions, except for differences in transportation costs 
between exporters and importers (Heckscher-Ohlin trade structure), we develop the Global 
Market scenario, which is explored in Section 5. 
2.4 Scenarios considered 
We consider a number of scenarios to investigate the implications for gas of different future 
energy and CO2 policies and of uncertainty in other factors to which gas use and production is 
sensitive. These alternative assumptions include: 
• No New Climate Policy which takes account of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA)—as they mandate biofuels, CAFE standards and subsidies to 
renewables—but it does not consider greenhouse gas reduction proposals in the 
Congress as of spring 2010 or potential regulations under the Clean Air Act.  
• A Price-Based Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Policy which imposes an 
economy-wide price on GHGs that gradually reduces emissions to 50% below 2005 
by 2050.  Similar reductions are imposed in other developed countries and with 
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China, India, Russia, Mexico, and Brazil beginning in 2020 on a linear path to 50% 
below their 2020 levels by 2070. The rest of the developing countries delay action to 
beyond 2050. 
These scenarios are simulated to 2050, and alternative cases consider the effects of the 80% 
confidence interval of estimated of gas resources, and the influence of alternative assumptions 
about the evolution of global gas markets. In addition, two other scenarios are explored: 
• A Regulatory Climate Policy which gradually retires coal power plants and phases in 
a renewable electricity portfolio standard requiring renewable to supply 25% of 
electric generation. 
• A Century-Scale Policy in which the simulation of a price-based policy is extended 
to 2100 with U.S. GHG emissions mitigation further tightened to 80% below the 
2005 level. This case is used to explore the relationship between near term gas use 
and other energy measures and the ability to meet longer-run climate goals.  
Because running all possible combinations of these alternative policies and sensitivities would 
create a prohibitively large number of possible scenarios, we investigate a selective set that 
highlight key determinants of the future role of natural gas.  
In the discussion below we report all results in terms of constant 2005 dollars. 
3. U.S. NATURAL GAS WITH NO ADDITIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 
Even absent additional greenhouse gas mitigation the future role of natural gas in the U.S. will 
be influenced by the extent and cost of domestic gas resources, and the nature of the international 
gas market (explored in Section 5). Unless gas resources are at the Low end of the resource 
estimates in Figure 2, domestic gas use and production are projected to grow substantially 
between now and 2050 (Figure 4). Under the Mean resource estimate U.S. gas production rises 
by roughly 40% between 2005 and 2050, and by a slightly higher 45% under the High estimate. 
It is only under the Low resource outcome that resource availability substantially limits growth 
in domestic production and use. In that case, gas production and use plateau near 2030 and are in 
decline by 2050. U.S. imports remain roughly the same regardless of the magnitude of domestic 
resources, and a small quantity of exports (mainly to Mexico) is sustained. Details of this EPPA 
projection, and selected others for results below, all assuming Mean gas resources, are provided 
in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4. U.S. Gas Use, Production and Imports & Exports (Tcf), and U.S. Gas Prices 
above bars (2005 $/1000 cf) for Low, Mean and High U.S. Resources. No Climate 
Policy and Regional Gas Markets.  
Natural gas prices are shown at the top of the bars in 2005 U.S. dollars. They rise over time as 
the lower-cost resources are depleted, and the lower the resource estimate the higher the 
projection of U.S. gas price. The difference across the range of resource scenarios is not great for 
most periods.  In 2030, for example, the High resource estimate yields a price 2% below that for 
the Mean estimate while the Low resource condition increases the price by 7%. The difference 
increases somewhat over time, especially for the Low resource case. By 2050 the price is 8% 
lower if the High resource conditions hold, but 50% higher if domestic resources are at the Low 
estimate.  
Because shale gas resources are the largest contributor to the recent re-evaluation of U.S. gas 
resources they have a substantial effect on these results.  In this no-policy case, with Mean 
resources, U.S. gas production rises by 42% between 2005 and 2050. If this projection is made 
without shale resources, production peaks in the vicinity of 2030 and declines back to its 2005 
level by 2050. The reduction in domestic gas production is then reflected in U.S. gas use which 
rises by 35% with the shale resources, but by only 8% without them.  
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U.S. energy use by source under the no-additional-policy assumption, and the Mean resources 
is shown in Figure 5. Electricity generation from natural gas (Figure 5a) would rise by about two 
thirds over the period 2005 to 2050. Coal would continue to dominate electric generation, with 
only a slightly growing contribution from nuclear power and renewable sources (wind and solar). 
Similarly for total U.S. energy (Figure 5b), gas use would rise by about half over the period, but 
would remain a roughly constant fraction of total energy use.  
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Figure 5. U.S. Electric Generation and Total Energy Use by Source, No Policy Case with 
Mean Gas Resources: (a) Electric Generation (TkWh), (b) Total Energy Use 
(Quadrillion Btu). 
4. EFFECTS OF GHG MITIGATION ON U.S. GAS PRODUCTION AND USE 
In recent years attention has been devoted to the use of GHG emissions pricing, achieved by 
implementing a cap-and-trade system though often supplemented by regulation and subsidies. 
Another possibility is a variety of other energy policies, perhaps motivated in large part by 
climate concerns, directed at specific technologies, especially those in electric generation. An 
incentive-based policy like a cap-and-trade system can vary from stringent to modest depending 
on what emissions cap or tax is set, how many offsets are allowed, and other possible cost-
containment features.  Similarly, there are endless variants of technology-based policies that 
might specify best available technology, create incentives for phase out of dirtier technologies, or 
require a certain percentage of clean technologies such as in a renewable energy standard. We 
consider the implications of one representation of each of these broad mitigation alternatives: 
first via a price-based approach and then applying a regulatory alternative. 
15 
 
4.1 Mitigation Applying a Price-Based Measure 
The futures of gas under a price-based GHG policy is explored using the simple emissions 
control scenario described in Section 2.4 under which the U.S. reduces its total emissions to 50% 
below the 2005 level by 2050. It is assumed that other countries take mitigation actions abroad 
because it seems unlikely that the U.S. would follow through on such a policy unless others 
participated as well, and actions abroad can affect the U.S. through international trade effects.  
The scenario is not designed to represent any specific policy proposal, and no provision is 
included for offsets. 
4.1.1 Gas Production, Use & Trade, and Resulting Prices  
Figure 6 presents the same information for the climate policy case as was presented in Figure 
4 for the no-new-policy scenario, adding the gas price at both producer and consumer levels (i.e., 
including the CO2 penalty). The broad features of U.S. gas markets under the assumed emissions 
restriction are not substantially different from the no-policy scenario, at least through 2040. Gas 
production and use grows somewhat more slowly, reducing use and production by a few Tcf in 
2040 compared with the case without climate policy. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2020 2030 2040 2050 
Tc
f
Exports
Production-
Exports
Imports
L     M      H L     M      H L     M      H
6.4
9.4
7.9
13.7
7.5
13.3
7.4
13.2
10.0
18.5
8.6
17.3
11.6
23.6
8.8
21.9
8.3
21.8
P
8.2
16.9
L     M      H
6.6
9.6
6.5
9.5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. U.S. Gas Use, Production and Imports & Exports (Tcf), and U.S. Gas Prices 
(2005 $/1000 cf) for Low, Mean and High U.S. Resources. Price-Based Climate Policy 
and Regional Gas Markets. Prices Are shown Without (top) and With (bottom) the 
Emissions Charge. 
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After 2040, however, domestic production and use begin to fall. The decline is driven by 
higher gas prices, CO2 charge inclusive, that gas users would see. The price reaches about $22 
per thousand cubic feet (cf) with well over half of that price reflecting the CO2 charge. While gas 
is less CO2-intensive than coal or oil, at the reduction level required by 2050 its CO2 emissions 
are beginning to represent an emissions problem. Nonetheless, even under the pressure of the 
assumed emissions policy, total gas use is projected to increase from 2005 to 2050 even for the 
Low estimate of domestic gas resources. 
4.1.2 Energy Quantities and Prices 
A major effect of the energy-wide, price-based mitigation is to reduce energy use (Figure 7). 
The effect on the electric sector (Figure 7a), is to flatten demand.  Nuclear, coal or gas with CCS 
and renewables are relatively expensive compared with gas generation without CO2 storage. 
(Coal and gas with CCS begin to enter the generation mix between 2040 and 2050 but are too 
small to show in the figure.) Conventional coal is driven from the generation mix by the CO2 
prices needed to meet the economy-wide emissions reduction targets, to be replaced mainly by 
natural gas. Natural gas is the substantial winner in the electric sector: the substitution effect, 
mainly gas generation for coal generation, outweighs the demand reduction effect.  
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Figure 7. Energy Mix under a Price-Based Climate Policy, Mean Gas Resources:  
(a) Electric Generation (Tkwh), (b) Total Energy Use (quadrillion Btu). 
For total energy (Figure 7b) the projected demand reduction is even stronger, leading to a 
decline in U.S. energy use of nearly 20 quadrillion (1015) Btu. The reduction in coal use is 
evident, and oil and current-generation biofuels (included in oil) begin to be replaced by 
advanced biofuels. Because national energy use is substantially reduced, the share represented by 
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gas is projected to rise from about 20% of the current national total to approximately 40% in 
2040. 
The U.S. GHG emissions price projected under this scenario is approximately $100 per ton 
CO2-e in 2030 and approaching $240 by 2050. The macroeconomic effect is to lower U.S. GDP 
by nearly 2% in 2030 and somewhat over 3% in 2050. A selection of resulting U.S. domestic 
prices is shown in Figure 8. Natural gas prices, exclusive of the CO2 price, are reduced slightly 
by the mitigation policy, but the price inclusive of the CO2 charge is greatly increased (Figure 
8a). The CO2 charge is nearly half of the user price of gas. Even in the No-Policy case electricity 
prices are projected to rise by 30% in 2030 and about 45% over the period to 2050 (Figure 8b). 
The assumed emissions mitigation policy is projected to cause electricity prices to rise by almost 
100% in 2030 and more than double by 2050 compared with current prices. (Also shown in the 
figure is the electricity price increase under a sample regulatory regime, to be discussed below.) 
Because of the estimated abundance of gas and limited opportunities for gas-oil substitution 
the current price premium in the U.S. of oil products over gas (on an energy basis) is maintained 
and even grows over time. One substitution option not modeled here is the possibility of 
conversion of gas to liquids, which might become economic and perhaps be further stimulated by 
security concerns, even though making no contribution to CO2 reduction. Such a development 
would raise U.S. gas use and prices, and lower oil demand with some moderating effect on the 
world oil price. 
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Figure 8. U.S. Natural Gas and Electricity Prices, Mean Gas Resources: (a) Natural Gas 
Prices (2005 $/1000 cf), (b) Electricity Prices (2005 $/kwh). 
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4.1.3 Policy Effects on Gas Use by Sector 
The 50% price-based mitigation policy will re-allocate gas use among economic activities.  
Figure 9 shows the gas use by sector as defined in the EPPA model for the Mean resource case. 
(Energy Intensive Industry Products and Other Industry Products are aggregated into a single 
industry sector.) Transportation includes both commercial transportation and private vehicles; 
the scenario does not allow for CNG vehicles (explored below) and so they have no effect on gas 
use.  In the No Policy case (Figure 9a) the greatest increase in gas use is in the industry sector 
and secondarily in residential use. Under assumed price-based emissions mitigation on the other 
hand (Figure 9b), gas use is reduced somewhat especially in the latter years.  A prominent 
feature is the shift of gas to electric generation from other sectors. 
The difference in response among sectors represents the combination of a substitution effect 
(gas against more CO2 intensive fuels) and an energy use reduction effect because the gas price, 
inclusive of the CO2 charge, is higher.  In the electricity sector, where gas is an effective 
substitute for coal, the substitution effect outweighs the demand reduction effect and so gas use 
increases.  Gas use is reduced in other uses where its competition is petroleum fuels or electricity 
where its carbon advantage is less. While there is a substitution effect, it is weaker and is 
outweighed by the demand reduction effect caused by higher prices.   
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Figure 9. Influence of Policy on Gas Use by Sector, Mean Gas Resources (quadrillion Btu), 
(a) No-Policy Reference Case, (b) Price-Based Policy. 
 
Energy intensive industries are a focus of particular concern in discussions of greenhouse gas 
mitigation and the role of natural gas, and projected effects in that sector are summarized in 
Table 3. Under the case with no emissions policy gas use in this sector is projected to rise by 
about 50% by 2050.  Under the assumed emissions policy gas use in this sector decreases by 
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about 10% over the simulation period. The total value of output of the sector is reduced as well, 
by approximately 8%. Imports of energy intensive products are projected to be about the same 
with and without mitigation, exports from this sector are reduced by 14%.  
Table 3. Effects on U.S. Energy Intensive Industries.  
 Reference Policy Case 
2005   
  Output ($ trillion) 1.84 1.84 
  Imports ($ trillion) 0.27 0.27 
  Exports ($ trillion) 0.24 0.24 
  Gas use (TCF) 4.30 4.30 
2030   
  Output ($ trillion) 3.51 3.40 
  Imports ($ trillion) 0.41 0.40 
  Exports ($ trillion) 0.59 0.55 
  Gas use (Tcf) 5.96 4.38 
2050   
  Output ($ trillion) 5.88 5.57 
  Imports ($ trillion) 0.70 0.67 
  Exports ($ trillion) 1.03 0.94 
  Gas use (Tcf) 7.07 3.94 
 
Considering the aggregation of sectors in the EPPA model the absolute values of these effects 
should not be accorded great weight. But they do suggest the trends to be expected from a price-
based policy: that is, gas will find its greatest economic value in displacing coal in the electric 
sector, and the higher prices needed to achieve this result will lead to gas being shifted out of 
other sectors, with the greatest percentage effect expected in trade-exposed sectors, which by the 
EPPA aggregation points to the industrial sectors in contrast to commercial, service and 
household users. 
4.1.4 Sensitivity to Costs of Competing Technologies  
Another influence on the future of natural gas is the costs of competing supplies, particularly 
in the electric power sector. Here we focus on three technologies to which gas use is particularly 
sensitive: cheaper renewable sources, lower-cost coal and gas with CCS, and lower-cost nuclear 
power. Also, we explore the prospect of gas use in household transportation. Because it would be 
difficult to construct an “equivalent” cost reduction applying to all of these technologies we 
explore the effect of one scenario of cost reduction for each, to give an impression of how energy 
markets would adjust and the effect on natural gas.  
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The results are shown in Table 4. To explore the effect of cheaper renewables we assume that 
an elasticity parameter that represents the ease of integrating wind into the grid is increased from 
1.0 to 3.0, as shown in Table 2. This change assumes the variability in the wind resource, and the 
need to match production with the load, requires less cost than in the base case. Lower-cost 
renewables yield a reduction in gas use in the electric sector by 1.8 Tcf in 2030, but total gas use 
falls by only 1.2 Tcf. In 2050 a difference in gas use is smaller, 0.5 Tcf and 0.1 Tcf respectively, 
as availability of cheaper renewables does not require an increase in nuclear power that by that 
time starts to replace gas in electric sector.  
To explore the effect of cheaper base-load generation the cost of coal and gas generation with 
CCS is lowered by about 25% (Table 2). At the higher-cost reference assumptions this 
technology does not become competitive until too late in the simulation period to have an effect 
on coal use. With less-costly CCS gas use increases in the electric sector, by nearly 3 Tcf, 
because both gas and coal generation with CCS become economic and share the low-carbon 
generation market (with about 25% of electricity produced by gas with CCS by 2050 and another 
25% by coal with CCS). Gas use in the economy as a whole increases even more, by 4.2 Tcf.  
The biggest impact on gas use in electricity results from the low-cost nuclear generation. 
Focusing on 2050, when the effects of alternative assumptions are the largest, a low-cost nuclear 
assumption reduces annual gas use in the electric sector by nearly 7 Tcf. Economy-wide gas use 
falls by only about 5 Tcf, however, because the resulting lower demand for gas in electricity 
leads to a lower price and more use in other sectors of the economy. 
Many other combinations of technological uncertainties could be explored, perhaps without 
adding to the insight to be drawn from these few model experiments: under a price-based 
mitigation policy natural gas is in a strong competitive position unless competing technologies 
are much cheaper than we now anticipate.  Also, because of its use in almost all sectors, the 
development of lower-cost competitors in any one sector, such as electric generation, leaves gas 
at a lower price absorbing at least some of the freed-up supply in other uses. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity to Technology Costs, Price Based Policy, Mean Gas Resources. 
2005 2030 2050    
Elec. Total Elec. Total Elec. Total 
Gas use (Tcf)  
  Ref technology 5.6 22.0 10.0 24.6 10.6 23.9 
  More renewables 5.6 22.0   8.1 23.4 10.2 23.8 
  Cheap CCS 5.6 22.0 10.5 25.5 13.6 28.2 
  Cheap Nuclear 5.6 22.0   9.4 24.5   3.4 18.5 
  CNG 5.6 22.0   9.9 25.3 10.0 24.5 
Gas price ($/1000 cf), net of CO2 charge 
  Ref technology     5.5     7.5     8.8 
  More renewables     5.5     7.5     8.6 
  Cheap CCS     5.5     7.6     9.3 
  Cheap Nuclear     5.5     7.5     8.2 
  CNG     5.5     7.6     8.9 
Gas price ($/1000 cf), inclusive of CO2 charge 
  Ref technology     5.5   13.3   21.9 
  More renewables     5.5   12.5   21.2 
  Cheap CCS     5.5   12.9   19.4 
  Cheap Nuclear     5.5   12.8   18.4 
  CNG     5.5   13.4   23.2 
 
The simulations above do not include the CNG vehicle. This policy case was simulated with 
this technology included, applying optimistic estimates of the cost penalty of the natural gas 
vehicle and the pace of development of fueling infrastructure.5 The result depends on 
assumptions about the way competing biofuels, and their potential indirect land-use effects, are 
accounted.6 Even with advanced biofuels credited as a zero-emissions option, however, CNG 
vehicles rise to about 15% of the private vehicle fleet by 2040-2050—which is projected to be 
much more efficient than today. They consume about 1.5 Tcf of gas at that time which, because 
of the effect of the resulting price increase on other sectors, adds approximately 1.0 Tcf to total 
national use.7  
4.1.5 Effects on U.S. Gas Transport Infrastructure   
The changing sources of gas within the U.S. may require changes in the existing 
transportation infrastructure, either more or different pipelines within the U.S. or more LNG 
                                                 
5 The implementation of the CNG vehicle in the EPPA model is documented by Kragha (2010). 
6 For analysis of this issue see Melillo et al. (2009). 
7 Substitution for motor fuel is the likely target of possible expansion of gas-to-liquids technology. Its market 
penetration would depend on competition not only with oil products but also with direct gas use, biofuels and 
electricity which reduce CO2 emissions while liquids from gas would not. 
22 
 
facilities.  To explore this prospect we consider the regional shifts in production and 
consumption within the U.S. employing the USREP model described in Section 2.  The USREP 
model does not resolve bilateral trade flows in the U.S. so we show (Figure 10) production, use 
and net exports or imports in each USREP region for 2006 and 2030 assuming Mean gas 
resources. 
Gas production increases most in those regions with the new shale resources.  It increases by 
more than 150% in the Northeast region (New England through the Great Lake States), by just 
about 50% in the South Central area that includes Texas, and 30% in the Mountain states.  In 
regions without new shale resource production changes very little—slight increases or decreases.  
Under the no-new-policy case (Figure 10a) the Northeast production increase comes close to 
matching the growth in consumption, so this result suggests little need for additional gas 
transportation infrastructure into this large-demand region (However, we do not model changes 
in intra-regional flows and investments may be needed to connect new producing areas to 
existing distribution networks). The biggest gas transportation implications would appear to be 
additional capacity to move gas from the Texas/South Central region and the Mountain states. 
These two regions increase their net exports by a combined 4 Tcf. The greater capacity would 
need to go to all other regions except the Northeast. 
Under climate policy (Figure 10b) those regions with the largest shale gas resources 
(Northeast and South Central) show increases in production but not nearly as large as in the no-
new-policy case.  Other regions show little change or a reduction in production. The possible 
new gas transportation requirements are less than in the no-new-policy case, but many of the 
general patterns are the same.8 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 National gas production and use with the USREP model differs slightly from the EPPA projections.  In the no-
new-policy case, gas production and use is slightly higher than in the EPPA simulations, and in the climate 
policy case it is a bit lower.  The USREP model captures inter-regional differences in coal and gas prices and 
better reflects differences in renewable costs among regions than does the nationally aggregated EPPA model, 
but it does not explicitly represent foreign trading partners.  The variation in results introduced by these 
differences in structure is well within the range of other uncertainties. 
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 (a) No New Policy Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (b) Price-Based Climate Policy Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Natural Gas Production and Consumption by Region in the U.S.: 2006 and 
2030 (Tcf): (a) No New Policy Scenario, (b) Price-Based Climate Policy Scenario. 
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4.2 Effects of a Regulatory Approach to Emissions Mitigation 
If emissions reductions are to be sought by means of regulatory and/or subsidy measures, with 
no price on emissions, many alternatives are available. Among the most obvious measures that 
could have a direct impact on CO2 emissions, would be those requiring renewable energy or 
encouraging a phase-out of existing coal-fired power plants. To explore this prospect we 
formulate a scenario with a renewable energy standard (RES) mandating a 25% renewable share 
of electric generation by 2030, and holding at that level through 2050, and measures to force 
retirement of coal fired power plants starting in 2020, so that coal plants accounting for 55% of 
current production are retired by 2050. Mean gas resources are assumed, as are the reference 
levels of all technology costs. The case results in approximately a 50% CO2 emissions reduction 
in the electricity sector by 2050, but it does not provide incentives to reduce emissions in non-
electric sectors, so these measures only hold national emissions to near the 2005 level up to 2040 
slightly rising afterwards mostly due to increased oil use.   
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Figure 11. Energy Mix under a Regulatory Policy, Mean Gas Resources: (a) Electric 
Generation (TkWh), (b) Total Energy Use (quadrillion Btu). 
The resulting projection of the role of natural gas is shown in Figure 11. One evident result, 
in comparison with Figure 7 is that the level of demand reduction in the electric sector is less 
than under the assumed price-based policy (Figure 11a). The lower reduction results from the 
lower electricity price, shown in Figure 8b, which carries no CO2 charge and only reflects the 
increased cost of generation imposed by the regulatory requirement.  The difference in reduction 
in the national total (Figure 11b) is more dramatic compared with Figure 7b because the all-
sector effect of the universal greenhouse-gas price is missing.  
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In the electric sector the rapid expansion of renewables tends to squeeze out gas-based 
generation in the early decades of the period. Of course, as can be seen in the figure, the impact 
on gas use depends heavily on the relative pace of implementation of the two regulatory 
measures in this experiment. Regarding total all-sector gas use, this set of assumption leads to a 
circumstance where gas continues to make a major contribution to national energy use, though 
potentially less than if all energy sources face the same penalties for their GHG emissions. 
5. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL GAS MARKETS 
Gas is priced under different conventions in different regions. In some situations prices are set 
in spot markets; in others they are dominated by contracts linking gas prices to prices of crude oil 
and oil products. As a result, gas prices can differ substantially among the regions. Here we 
consider a case where those institutional differences disappear.  The main reason that we might 
expect such a change in market structure is that price differences among regions become so large 
that profits can be made above the cost of transport. The magnitude of supply from abroad would 
depend on the development of supply capacity by those nations with very large resources 
(mainly Russia and countries in the Middle East), or perhaps the expansion of nonconventional 
sources elsewhere, and as influenced by national and industry policies regarding trade and 
contract forms. To the extent the structure evolves in this direction, however, there are major 
implications for U.S. natural gas production and use. To investigate the potential evolution of an 
integrated global market akin to crude oil, we simulate a case where gas prices are equalized in 
all markets except for fixed differentials that reflect transport costs.9  
Projected effects on U.S. production and trade are shown in Figure 12 for the 50% price-
based GHG reduction and High, Mean and Low gas resources cases. This result may be 
compared with the Regional Markets case shown in Figure 6. Beginning in the period 2020 to 
2030, the cost of U.S. gas begins to rise above that of supplies from abroad and the U.S. becomes 
more dependent on imports of gas. By 2050, the U.S. depends on imports for about 50% of its 
gas in the Mean resource case.  U.S. gas use rises to near the level in the no-policy case because 
prices are lower.  U.S. gas use and prices are much less affected by the level of domestic 
                                                 
9 In the Global Markets case (Heckscher-Ohlin assumption) the EPPA model does not resolve bilateral trade flows.  
Exports go into an international pool and importing countries import from the pool, taking account of 
transportation cost. In this method countries cannot simultaneously export and import, so the scenarios we 
resolve only the net trade—gross trade could be somewhat larger, although for energy there is in general not a 
large difference between net and gross trade.   
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resources, because the effect on prices is moderated by the availability of imports. The 
development of an efficient international market, with decisions about supply and imports made 
on an economic basis, would have complex effects: it would benefit the U.S. economically, limit 
the development of domestic resources, and lead to growing import dependence. 
 
Figure 12. U.S. Gas Use, Production and Imports & Exports (Tcf), and U.S. Gas Prices 
($/1000 cf) for Low, Mean and High U.S. Resources Price-Based Climate Policy and 
Global Gas Markets. Prices are shown Without (top) and With (bottom) the Emissions 
Charge.  
Possible international gas trade flows that are consistent with U.S. and global demand under 
the Regional and Integrated Global Market are shown in Figure 13. A no-new-policy case is 
shown. Under Regional Market conditions (Figure 13a) trade flows are large within gas market 
regions but small among them. To avoid a cluttered map, small trade flows (less than 1 Tcf) are 
not shown in the figure, but to be seen are U.S. imports from Canada, the imports to the EU from 
Russia and Africa and the imports into Japan, Korea and China from South East Asia and the 
Middle East. Trade flows can be particularly sensitive to the development of transportation 
infrastructure and political considerations, and so projections of bilateral trade in gas are 
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particularly uncertain. The Regional Markets case tends to increase trade among partners where 
trade already exists, locking in patterns determined in part by historical political considerations.  
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Figure 13. Major Trade Flows of Natural Gas among the EPPA regions in 2030, No New 
Policy (Tcf): (a) Regional Markets, (b) Global Market. 
If an efficient Global Market is assumed to develop, then substantial flows among current 
trading regions would result. As in the Global Market scenario we do not resolve bilateral trade 
flows (see footnote 9), the flows pictured in Figure 13b are consistent with demand and supply 
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and net exports in each region but there are other flows that are also consistent. Here we show 
the U.S. to import from the Middle East as well as from Canada and Russia, and movements 
from the Middle East to Asia and Europe would increase—implying a substantial expansion of 
LNG facilities. Russian gas would begin to move into Asian markets, via some combination of 
pipeline transport and LNG. 
The precise patterns of trade that might develop to 2030 and beyond will be influenced by the 
economics of the energy industry, as captured by the EPPA model, and also by national 
decisions regarding gas production and imports. Therefore, the numbers shown are subject to a 
number of uncertainties, prominent among which is the willingness of Middle-East and Russian 
suppliers to produce and export. If potential supplies are not forthcoming then global prices 
would be higher and the U.S. would import less than projected, or perhaps increase exports. 
The broad insight to be drawn from these simulations is nonetheless evident: to the degree 
that economics is allowed to determine the global gas market, trade in this fuel is likely to 
increase over coming decades. A few years ago there was significant development of LNG 
capacity in the U.S. on the expectation that U.S. resources were limited and likely more 
expensive than international supplies. Had that expectation proved correct, the world might have 
proceeded faster toward the development of a more broadly integrated global market.  
6. LONGER-TERM PROSPECTS UNDER DEEPER EMISSIONS CUTS 
While current investment and policy decisions appropriately focus on a shorter horizon, 
policy decisions related to atmospheric stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations inevitably 
involve a very long term perspective. Though gas frequently is touted as a “bridge” to the future, 
continuing effort is needed to prepare for that future, lest the gift of greater domestic gas 
resources turn out to be a bridge with no landing point on the far bank.  
To illustrate these concerns we extend the simulation period to 2100 and assume that a price-
based policy is implemented with the objective of further reducing U.S. emissions to 80% below 
2005 levels by 2080 and remain at that level. Developed countries follow this same path. China, 
India, Brazil, Russia, and Mexico deepen their emissions reductions to 40% below 2020 by 2070 
and remain at that level.  The Mean estimate of gas resources and cost is imposed along with the 
reference values of the costs of competing energy sources. To project economic variables to 
2050 is a heroic act, and to 2100 even more so, but this scenario provides insight to issues 
attending the near-term exploitation of the newly-expanded domestic gas resource.  
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As seen most clearly in the electric sector (Figure 14) the combination of depletion (riding up 
the cost curves in Figure 1) and the CO2 price borne by gas, this fuel is priced out of the market 
for electric generation. Nuclear remains cheaper than coal or gas with CCS for most of the period 
and so expands to fill the continuing electricity demand. Different cost assumptions well within 
the range of uncertainty would lead to a different mix of low-CO2 substitutes, but the picture for 
gas without CCS would remain the same.  
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Figure 14. Energy Mix in Electric Generation under a Price-Based Climate Policy, Mean 
Natural Gas Resources and Regional Natural Gas Markets (TkWh). 
One factor that could result in a continuing role for gas would be advances in CCS with 
natural gas generation.  The challenge to this occurring is that gas prices are continuing to rise 
even with the expanded resource base, and gas generation with CCS would need to compete with 
coal generation with CCS where the coal price is much lower.  This continuing role for gas in 
generation with CCS would depend on the overall efficiency of gas, the CO2 capture rate, and 
any other advantages CCS might have in gas generation over that in coal, and these would need 
to be substantial enough to compensate for the higher price of gas compared with coal.  The 
general pattern seen in electricity use also appears in the total energy use, although gas holds a 
position in non-electric uses to the end of the century.  
An implication to be drawn from this longer-term experiment is that plentiful supplies of 
domestic gas in the near term should not detract from preparation for the longer-term emissions 
challenge. Barriers to the expansion of nuclear power or coal and/or gas generation with CCS 
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must be resolved over the next few decades, so they are capable of expanding to replace natural 
gas. If facilitating policies are not pursued—by means of RD&D and development of regulatory 
structures—because of comfort with the gas cushion, then the longer-term sustenance or 
strengthening of an emissions mitigation regime will not be possible. 
7. A SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The easiest generalization of this exploration of the future of natural gas is that the outlook for 
gas over the next several decades is highly favorable. Shale gas resources add significantly to the 
U.S. resource base and allow production to increase whereas in their absence production would 
likely decline or at best sustain current levels. Naturally the gas resource base and costs of 
accessing it are uncertain. The upside uncertainty has less of an impact on domestic production 
levels because at the Mean estimate of resources supply is adequate to meet growing demand at 
moderate prices through 2050. Even at the pessimistic end of estimates, however, in the absence 
of additional GHG mitigation U.S. gas production and use is projected to be higher in 2050 than 
today. 
A stringent policy of greenhouse gas reduction, if pursued with a price-based policy that 
would yield a level playing field for competing energy sources, would favor gas relative to other 
fossil fuels. The share of gas in total energy use is projected to be larger with such a policy, 
though overall energy use would be lower. Only under the Low end of the range of domestic 
resources would gas use in 2050 be lower than today. Regulatory energy policies that might be 
driven in part by efforts to lower CO2 emissions could be less favorable for natural gas 
depending on the relative stringency and timing of the regulations. 
With or without GHG emissions mitigation the changing distribution of U.S. gas production, 
particularly the exploitation of shale resources, will require some expansion in the long-distance 
pipeline network, primarily to accommodate shipment of gas out of the South Central region to 
areas other than the North East, though the imposition of emissions mitigation reduces the need 
such changes in this system. 
Gas competes most strongly in the electric power sector, especially under climate policy, 
because it has much lower CO2 emissions than coal. The technology is well-known and 
inexpensive compared with alternatives such as nuclear, CCS or renewables. On a level playing 
field, only with significant cost breakthroughs or very stringent CO2 reduction targets would 
these alternative sources compete effectively with gas over the next few decades. Thus in the 
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electric generation sector natural gas is a bridge fuel under climate policy, providing a cleaner 
alternative to coal. With continued tightening of CO2 constraints beyond 2050, however, the CO2 
emissions from gas generation eventually will require adoption of other, still-lower carbon 
emitting generation technologies. The shale gas resource is far from a panacea over the longer 
term and investment in the development of still lower CO2 technologies remains an important 
priority. 
If a more tightly integrated world gas market develops and low cost conventional resources in 
the Middle East and Russia are accessible to the market, then economic conditions would favor 
increasing U.S. LNG imports even with large resources of domestic shale. While some of the 
shale resources can compete with these low cost foreign sources, much of the resource is 
expected to be more costly to produce and so would not compete purely on economic grounds. 
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APPENDIX A: Levelized Cost of Electricity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Units Pulverized Coal NGCC
NGCC 
with CCS
IGCC 
with CCS
Advanced 
Nuclear Wind Biomass
Solar 
Thermal Solar PV
Wind Plus 
Biomass 
Backup  [a]
Wind Plus 
NGCC 
Backup [a]
[1] "Overnight" Capital Cost $/kW 2049 892 1781 3481 3521 1812 3548 4731 5688 5360 2705
[2] Total Capital Requirement $/kW 2377 964 1995 4177 4930 1957 4116 5109 6144 5789 2921
[3] Capital Recovery Charge Rate % 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6%
[4] Fixed O&M $/kW 25.9 11.0 18.8 43.5 84.8 28.6 60.7 53.5 11.0 89.2 39.6
[5] Variable O&M $/kWh 0.0043 0.0019 0.0028 0.0042 0.0005 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 0.0019
[6] Project Life years 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
[7] Capacity Factor % 85% 85% 80% 80% 85% 35% 80% 35% 26% 42% 42%
[8] (Capacity Factor Wind) 35% 35%
[9] (Capacity Factor Biomass/NGCC) 7% 7%
[10] Operating Hours hours 7446 7446 7008 7008 7446 3066 7008 3066 2277.6 3679.2 3679.2
[11] Capital Recovery Required $/kWh 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.0621 0.1761 0.2850 0.1663 0.0839
[12] Fixed O&M Recovery Required $/kWh 0.003 0.001 0.00 0.0062 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01
[13] Heat Rate BTU/kWh 8740 6333 7493 8307 10488 0 7765 0 0 7765 6333
[14] Fuel Cost $/MMBTU 1.40 6.08 6.08 1.40 0.63 0.00 1.03 0.00 0.00 1.03 6.08
[15] (Fraction Biomass/NGCC) % 8.8% 8.2%
[16] Fuel Cost per kWh $/kWh 0.0122 0.0385 0.0456 0.0116 0.0066 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0032
[17] Levelized Cost of Electricity $/kWh 0.054 0.056 0.085 0.092 0.088 0.077 0.085 0.194 0.290 0.198 0.100
[18] Markup Over Coal 1.00 1.03 1.57 1.71 1.64 1.43 1.58 3.60 5.39 3.67 1.85
[19] Amount Fossil Fuel EJ/KWh 7.905E-12 8.76E-12
[20] Carbon Content mmtC/EJ 13.700 24.686  
[21] Carbon Emissions mmtC/KWh 0.0000 0.0000
[22] Carbon Dioxide Emissions tCO2/KWh 0.0004 0.0008
[23] CO2 Emissions after 90% Capture tCO2/KWh 3.971E-05 7.93E-05
[24] Cost of CO2 T&S $/tCO2 10 10
[25] CO2 Transportation and Storage Cost $/KWh 0.0036 0.0071
[a]
[1] Input, from EIA 2010
[2]
[3] =r/(1-(1+r) (^-[6])) where r is discount rate. The discount rate is 8.5%.
[4] Input, from EIA 2010
[5] Input, from EIA 2010
[6] Input, assumption
[7] Input, standard assumptions 
[8] Input, assumption
[9] Input, assumption
[10] =8760*[7] (8760 is the number of hours in a year)
[11] =([2]*[3])/[10]
[12] =[4]/[10]
[13] Input, from EIA 2010
[14] Input, from EIA data, 5-year average price from 2002-2006
[15] =[9]*80% for wind plus biomass; =[9]*85% for wind plus NGCC
[16] =[13]*[14]/1000000; for wind with backup =([13]*[14]/1000000)*[15] 
[17] =[5]+[11]+[12]+[16]; for CCS technologies this also includes CO2 T&S costs from [25]
[18] =[17]/([17] for coal) 
[19] =[13]*(1.055*10 -^15)
[20] Input, from EPPA model
[21] =[19]*[20]
[22] =[21]*(44/12)*1000000
[23] =[22]*(1-0.9), assuming 90% capture
[24] Input, from Hamilton (2009)
[25] =([22]-[23])*[24]
For CCS
[Note: EIA 2010 costs for wind technology are for a typical plant. In the EPPA model wind is distinguished by wind resource quality. The LCOE for wind without backup is reduced to 
$0.06/kWh in this study to reflect higher quality wind resources. Lower quality wind resources that require backup are represented by wind plus biomass and wind plus NGCC 
technologies.] 
A combined wind and biomass plant (or wind and gas plant) assumes that there is 1 KW installed capacity of biomass (or gas) for every 1 KW installed capacity of wind, and 
assumes the wind plant has a capacity factor of 35% and the biomass (or gas) plant has a capacity factor of 7%, operating only as needed to eliminate the variability of the wind 
resource.
[1]+([1]*0.4*y) where y=construction time in years: coal=4, NGCC=2, IGCC with CCS=5, NGCC with CCS=3, nuclear=5, wind=2, biomass=4, solar=2, wind with biomass=2, wind 
with NGCC=2. For nuclear there is an additional cost of ([1]*0.2) for decomission. For nuclear there is additional cost of ([1]*0.2) for the decomission cost.
[Note: In the EPPA model transmission and distribution cost is $0.02/kWh for all technologies except wind with backup for which the cost is $0.03/kWh.]
[EIA 2010 source refers to Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Early Release. Note: EIA uses $2008, here they are converted to $2005 (conversion factor from 
$2008 to $2005 is 0.9218 (from Bureau of Economic Analysis: http://www.bea.gov/))]
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APPENDIX B: Details of Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS
Population (million) 310 326 341 357 373 390 406 422 439
GDP (trillion 2005$) 13 15 17 19 22 25 28 32 36
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GDP per capita (thousand 2005$) 41 45 49 53 58 63 69 76 83
Welfare (trillion 2005$) 8 10 11 13 15 17 19 21 2
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO 2 -E Price (2005$/tCO 2 -e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRICES (2005$)  
Exclusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 75.70 84.10 94.32 106.29 118.08 127.05 137.31 148.16
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 6.39 6.86 7.40 8.05 8.63 9.16 9.76 10.37
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 24.77 26.41 28.25 30.50 32.79 34.87 37.06 39.41
Inlusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 75.70 84.10 94.32 106.29 118.08 127.05 137.31 148.16
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 6.39 6.86 7.40 8.05 8.63 9.16 9.76 10.37
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 24.77 26.41 28.25 30.50 32.79 34.87 37.06 39.41
     Electricity ($/kWh 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO 2 -e)
GHG Emissions 6635.9 7282.3 7543.5 7820.8 8179.7 8571.1 8956.1 9340.2 9754.9
CO 2  Emissions 5660.2 6252.2 6488.5 6726.2 7042.8 7378.8 7706.1 8028.8 8363.1
CH 4 Emissions 497.3 520.8 528.1 538.5 552.5 571.7 589.2 607.4 631.0
N 2 O Emissions 370.7 386.1 393.5 402.6 413.6 435.5 459.3 484.3 520.3
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 107.8 123.3 133.4 153.5 170.8 185.1 201.6 219.6 240.5
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (qBTU)
Coal 19.1 21.3 22.5 23.7 25.2 26.9 28.4 29.9 31.5
Oil 37.5 41.4 42.2 43.1 44.4 45.8 47.2 48.6 50.1
Natural Gas 22.0 24.0 25.2 26.3 27.8 29.4 30.8 32.3 33.8
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.9 9.1
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.0
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Primary Energy Use 91.7 100.1 103.6 107.1 111.7 116.7 121.7 126.7 132.0
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal w/o CCS 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.6
Oil w/o CCS 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Gas w/o CCS 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Nuclear 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Hydro 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Renewables 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Electricity Production 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.1 6.5
No Policy
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (TkWh)
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2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS
Population (million) 310 326 341 357 373 390 406 422 439
GDP (trillion 2005$) 13 15 17 19 21 24 27 31 35
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 -0.49 -0.82 -1.20 -1.66 -2.06 -2.43 -2.88 -3.45
GDP per capita (thousand 2005$) 41 45 48 52 57 62 68 74 80
Welfare (trillion 2005$) 8 10 11 13 14 16 19 21 2
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 -0.18 -0.42 -0.72 -1.10 -1.51 -1.90 -2.41 -3.04
CO 2 -E Price (2005$/tCO 2 -e) 0.00 34.00 53.59 76.98 105.51 135.62 156.62 178.11 238.40
PRICES (2005$)  
Exclusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 74.29 81.64 89.17 97.97 104.85 107.32 109.65 113.42
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 6.15 6.51 6.91 7.51 8.23 8.61 8.99 8.77
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 22.14 21.96 20.93 19.64 17.92 17.70 17.83 18.95
Inlusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 89.65 105.86 123.95 145.65 166.12 178.09 190.13 221.14
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 8.03 9.47 11.16 13.33 15.71 17.25 18.82 21.93
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 91.77 131.71 178.61 235.74 295.68 338.48 382.62 507.23
     Electricity ($/kWh 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO 2 -e)
GHG Emissions 6635.9 5797.3 5457.5 5117.0 4776.5 4436.1 4095.5 3754.8 3413.4
CO 2  Emissions 5660.2 5197.3 4866.6 4534.9 4211.5 3888.9 3553.7 3216.0 2870.4
CH 4 Emissions 497.3 319.7 313.4 306.7 291.1 270.7 270.4 272.1 271.6
N 2 O Emissions 370.7 274.5 271.9 270.0 268.4 271.5 266.5 262.0 266.7
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 107.8 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (qBTU)
Coal 19.1 15.1 12.3 9.2 5.4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8
Oil 37.5 37.0 35.9 34.9 33.8 32.3 24.3 16.2 13.0
Natural Gas 22.0 21.2 21.5 22.1 24.5 29.0 28.7 27.7 23.8
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 7.6 8.1 8.3 8.6 9.1 9.5 10.3 11.8 16.0
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.7
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 2.9 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.7 6.2
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.1 8.2 9.5
Total Primary Energy Use 91.7 87.9 85.0 82.4 80.9 80.1 76.6 73.6 72.9
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 12.2 18.6 24.7 30.8 36.5 45.1 53.1 59.0
Coal w/o CCS 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil w/o CCS 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas w/o CCS 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.7
Nuclear 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.7
Hydro 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Renewables 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Electricity Production 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.5
Price Policy
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (TkWh)
4
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2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS
Population (million) 310 326 341 357 373 390 406 422 439
GDP (trillion 2005$) 13 15 17 19 21 24 28 32 36
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 -0.01 -0.26 -0.53 -0.74 -0.87 -0.99 -1.04 -1.05
GDP per capita (thousand 2005$) 41 45 49 52 57 63 69 75 82
Welfare (trillion 2005$) 8 10 11 13 14 16 19 21 2
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.38 -0.61 -0.78 -0.91 -1.00 -1.04
CO 2 -E Price (2005$/tCO 2 -e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRICES (2005$)  
Exclusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 75.31 83.00 92.02 102.64 112.83 119.76 127.44 135.13
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 6.34 6.74 7.20 7.83 8.43 9.03 9.67 10.69
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 22.80 22.08 21.98 22.18 22.45 22.62 22.89 23.16
Inlusive of Carbon Charge
     Oil Product ($/barrel) 66.63 75.31 83.00 92.02 102.64 112.83 119.76 127.44 135.13
     Natural Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) 5.73 6.34 6.74 7.20 7.83 8.43 9.03 9.67 10.69
     Coal ($/short ton) 22.75 22.80 22.08 21.98 22.18 22.45 22.62 22.89 23.16
     Electricity ($/kWh 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO 2 -e)
GHG Emissions 6635.9 6831.3 6515.2 6424.3 6476.8 6654.6 6870.6 7143.4 7466.9
CO 2  Emissions 5660.2 5810.8 5484.8 5362.0 5376.6 5500.6 5663.9 5871.4 6120.0
CH 4 Emissions 497.3 512.9 508.9 513.0 522.6 540.3 554.4 573.1 591.2
N 2 O Emissions 370.7 384.9 389.8 398.2 409.7 432.2 455.0 484.1 520.5
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 107.8 122.7 131.7 151.2 167.9 181.5 197.3 214.9 235.3
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (qBTU)
Coal 19.1 16.7 12.6 10.3 8.6 7.6 7.1 7.3 7.4
Oil 37.5 41.4 41.9 42.7 44.2 45.8 47.6 49.4 51.4
Natural Gas 22.0 23.9 24.6 25.2 26.6 28.6 30.2 31.2 33.1
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 7.6 7.9 8.3 8.6 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.8 9.9
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.5
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 2.9 4.4 6.7 8.5 10.0 11.0 11.9 12.7 12.4
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Primary Energy Use 91.7 97.1 97.1 98.5 101.7 105.4 109.5 113.9 117.8
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 3.0 6.5 8.6 10.0 11.3 12.1 12.8 14.1
Coal w/o CCS 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Oil w/o CCS 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Gas w/o CCS 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
Nuclear 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Hydro 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Renewables 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Electricity Production 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.6
Regulatory Policy
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (TkWh)
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